|
DOCUMENTS
OF THE Katipunan |
|
|
|
The “Acta de Tejeros” March
23, 1897 Source: Photographs of the first,
seventh and eighth pages of the original document in Carlos Ronquillo, Ilang talata tungkol sa paghihimagsik nang
1896-1897, [1898] edited by Isagani R. Medina, (Quezon City: University
of the Philippines Press, 1996), pp.98; 100; and 101 respectively; and a
transcription of the second to sixth pages inclusive by Medina in the same
volume, pp.97 and 99. |
||
|
Introduction The document transcribed below does not bear any heading or title, but
is widely known as the “Acta de Tejeros”.
It proclaims that the convention held at Tejeros the previous day had
been so disorderly, so tarnished by skullduggery, that its decisions were
illegitimate and invalid. Patriots
who remain true to the ideals of the Katipunan, the signatories in effect
affirm, should not recognize the government instituted at the convention, and
should disregard the election of its leaders – Emilio Aguinaldo as President;
Mariano Trias as Vice-President; Artemio Ricarte as Captain General; Emiliano
Riego de Dios as Director of War; and Andres Bonifacio as Director of the
Interior. The Tejeros
convention was a pivotal event in the Philippine revolution, and its
consequences remain contentious to this day.
Because the protestations voiced in the “Acta” failed to nullify its
outcome, it was the point at which the overall leadership of the struggle
against Spain passed from the Katipunan to the nascent government, and from
Bonifacio to Aguinaldo. And it had a
deeper significance beyond organizational structures and personalities, some
nationalist historians argue, because it symbolized the seizure of the
revolutionary movement by the Caviteño elite, and the defeat of the
revolution of the masses. [1] Here not intended
to revisit the debates about class and ideology, or to attempt to give an
overview of the revolution in Above the
signatures on the “Acta” are penned the words “Ang Haring bayan” (“The
Sovereign People”), which suggests that the signatories profess to be voicing
the will of the nation at large. They
issue the proclamation, too, “in the name of the Katipunan”. But most insistently they speak and act on
behalf of the particular territorial unit within the Katipunan they call the
Magdiwang Presidency. “We ratify this
document,” they affirm, “under a binding oath to commit our lives and wealth
to the defence and support of our said Presidency.” What at first
sight is most puzzling about the “Acta” is that it rejects the outcome of a
convention at which Magdiwang partisans had supposedly been in a clear
majority. When one reads the grounds
advanced by the signatories for nullifying the proceedings – dark
conspiracies, ineligible electors, pre-marked ballot papers - the questions
that repeatedly spring to mind are therefore “Why did you, as leaders of the
Magdiwang, allow these things to happen?
Why did you lose control?” A closer look at
the Tejeros drama, however, suggests that these might be the wrong questions
to ask. Magdiwang
and Magdalo The Magdiwang
first came into existence as an ordinary balangay (branch) of the
Katipunan in the town of From its capitals
in northern Cavite – at first Noveleta and later San Francisco de Malabon –
the Magdiwang council extended its influence southwards and westwards to the
towns of Rosario, Tanza, Naik, Ternate, Maragondon, Bailen, Magallanes,
Indang and Alfonso, and also to Nasugbu, Tuy and Look in the province of
Batangas. The Magdalo council, similarly,
from its capitals in northern The
oft-recounted rivalry between the Magdiwang and Magdalo, in short, was
confined to a relatively small geographical area – the The Magdiwang, Andres Bonifacio and the Katipunan
Supreme Council Andres Bonifacio
was invited to It
is not known whether Bonifacio acted alone in the name of the Supreme Council
whilst in The Imus assembly Towards the end of
December 1896, Bonifacio presided over an assembly of Magdiwang and Magdalo
leaders, convened by the Magdalo in their capital of Imus to discuss whether
to retain the existing Katipunan structure or to establish a revolutionary
government. [5] The Magdiwang favored the former option,
and the Magdalo the latter, and after heated exchanges the meeting broke up
without resolution on this key point.
Nevertheless, the assembly did agree, according to Ricarte and
Alvarez, to appoint Bonifacio to head a “legislative
committee” or “congress” (“Lupung Tagapagbatas” or “Kapulungan”) and to
authorize him to appoint as its members “some people he considered to be
worthy” (“ilang taong inaakala niyang karapat-dapat”).[6] It is not known whether Bonifacio ever did
appoint members to this body, or whether it ever met, but in the early months
of 1897 some of his communications were stamped with a seal bearing the words
“Haring Bayan Katagalugan – Kataastaasang Kapulungan” – “Sovereign Nation of
Katagalugan – Supreme Congress”. Even
if the Congress never convened – due perhaps to the exigencies of war – it
appears that Bonifacio believed that it should convene when circumstances
permitted, and that it would be a step towards establishing a revolutionary
government. The Tejeros convention: (i) the agenda Three months after
the Imus assembly, on March 22, 1897, leading representatives of the two
councils convened again, this time in Magdiwang territory at the casa
hacienda in Tejeros. Though its
fateful consequences are well known, almost everything else about the
convention is shrouded in doubt, not least because the sources available are
few, partisan and conflicting. One of the critical
uncertainties about the Tejeros gathering is its purpose, its planned
agenda. Ricarte and Alvarez – the only
actual participants to leave memoirs – both say the original intention was to
discuss how the Magdiwang and Magdalo councils could better co-ordinate their
efforts to defend the liberated This version of
events, however, is contradicted by a contemporary letter that pertains to
the invitation to Tejeros.[8] This letter, sent by the president of the
Magdalo council, Baldomero Aguinaldo (a cousin of Emilio), to Felix Cuenca
and Mariano Noriel, two prominent Magdalo members in the town of There seems to be
little doubt, then, that the election of a revolutionary government was on
the Tejeros agenda from the outset. On
close reading, in fact, neither the “Acta” nor the account of the convention
given by Bonifacio in his letter to Jacinto dated April 24, 1897 contends
otherwise. The “Acta” does not protest
against the election in principle. “As
regards the election,” the relevant passage begins, “…we came to an
agreement with…the Magdalo Presidency…and [the election] was accordingly held
yesterday…” [Emphasis added]. The reason why the election should be
annulled, according to the “Acta”, is not that it was unsanctioned or
unplanned, but that it was blighted by misconduct.[11] Bonifacio tells
Jacinto that at Tejeros he had argued that the election should not proceed
“because the representatives from other provinces (“hukuman”) were not present, aside from which I said that a
decision had already been reached [about this matter] at the meeting held in
the town of Bonifacio had a
valid point when he argued that the elections should be deferred until such
time as delegates from other provinces (hukuman)
could attend and the new revolutionary government could be established on a
more representative foundation. He
rightly foresaw that any government formed at Tejeros might claim to be
national in scope but in reality would be composed almost
entirely of men from a single province, The
Tejeros convention: (ii) the delegates Nobody knows the
total number of delegates who attended the Tejeros convention, but the
sources give the names of twenty-six.
Alvarez names fifteen participants on the Magdiwang side when he first
narrates the events at Tejeros (in chapter 32 of his account), and to these
can be added – by virtue of their close association with the Magdiwang
council -Andres Bonifacio and a prominent member of his staff, Teodoro
Gonzales.[13] No other sources, so far as is known, add
any further names. The full list of
these seventeen delegates, together with their respective home towns, is as
follows:- Mariano Alvarez (Noveleta) Pascual Alvarez (Noveleta) Santiago Alvarez (Noveleta) Andres Bonifacio (Manila; staying in San
Francisco de Malabon) Severino de las Alas (Indang) Jose del Rosario (Tanza) Teodoro Gonzales (Manila, staying in San
Francisco de Malabon) Jacinto Lumbreras (San Francisco de
Malabon) Diego Mojica (San Francisco de Malabon) Pablo Mojica (San Francisco de Malabon) Santos Nocon (San Francisco de Malabon) Artemio Ricarte (Batac, Ilocos Norte;
living in San Francisco de Malabon) Emiliano Riego de Dios (Maragondon) Santiago Rillo (Tuy, Batangas; formerly
Maragondon) Luciano San Miguel (Noveleta) Mariano Trias (San Francisco de Malabon) Ariston
Villanueva (Noveleta) Emilio
Aguinaldo, meanwhile, recalls in his memoir that only eight Magdalo
delegates were able to attend the Tejeros convention, mainly because Magdalo
towns were then bearing the brunt of the Spanish onslaught.[14] He names four, and from other sources Baldomero Aguinaldo (Kawit) Crispulo Aguinaldo (Kawit) Felix Cuenca (Bacoor) Tomas Mascardo (Kawit) Antonio
Montenegro ( Sixto Sapinoso (Imus) Daniel Tirona (Kawit) Cayetano Topacio (Imus) Licerio
Topacio (Imus) The Magdiwang and
its associates, the memoirists record, not only had clearly the greater
number of these “named” individuals, who presumably included all the most
influential delegates, but also held the chair at the convention and provided
its secretaries. The presiding officer
was at first Jacinto Lumbreras, and subsequently Andres Bonifacio, and
Artemio Ricarte and Teodoro Gonzales are said to have acted as the
secretaries. The leading
protagonists, according to Alvarez, mostly sat at a long table, whilst
everyone else stood in groups around the sides. Although it is safe to assume that the
overwhelming majority came from The
Tejeros convention: (iii) the balance of opinion Since the “rank-and-file”
delegates who stood around the long table are obscured by so many intractable
unknowns, any discussion about what happened at Tejeros must inevitably
return to the more prominent, seated figures whose names the memoirists
recall. There is no reason, in any
event, to suppose that the prominent figures did not represent the overall
balance of opinion at the meeting, and there is no evidence that their
leadership was challenged, or their wishes thwarted, by some kind of
“rank-and-file” revolt. If we assume that
the “rank-and-file” delegates backed their respective leaderships, and if the
Magdiwang majority had been as clear cut as Alvarez, Ricarte, Aguinaldo and
countless secondary sources say, then the wishes of the Magdiwang council, to
state the obvious, would have prevailed.
But they did not,
as the “Acta” incontrovertibly testifies.
Bonifacio’s attempt to persuade the assembled delegates to defer the
election of a government might suggest that he recognized from the very start
that he and his Magdiwang allies did not hold a secure majority. The convention’s rejection of his arguments
must have immediately confirmed his fears.
To explain why the
convention decided to press ahead with the elections, and why Aguinaldo was
elected as president rather than Bonifacio, we need to look more attentively
at the allegiances of some of the delegates who Santiago Alvarez and other
sources identify as leaders or allies of the Magdiwang camp. Alvarez was a
member of the Magdiwang inner circle: Captain General of the Magdiwang’s
troops, son of the council’s president, and cousin of the council’s interior
minister. His memoir contains a huge
wealth of information about the revolution of 1896-7 in general, and about
events Mariano Trias, firstly, who
taken office around January 1897 as the Magdiwang minister of welfare and
justice, is said by Alvarez to have switched his allegiance to the Magdalo
council in February 1897 following disputes with his colleagues over military
matters. Trias, recounts Alvarez, had
started to organize his own private army, and to commission his own
subordinate officers, independently of the unified Magdiwang command. Rebuked by other Magdiwang ministers, and
by Alvarez himself as Captain General of the Magdiwang forces, Trias had
defected to the Magdalo forces, accepting the rank of lieutenant general and
taking with him two senior officers, Mariano San Gabriel and Julian Montalan,
and their respective troop detachments.[17] The alienated Trias not only depleted
Magdiwang military strength by his action, he also persuaded Emiliano
Riego de Dios, the Magdiwang minister of welfare, to defect as well. Riego de Dios departed, Alvarez recalls
with a note of bitterness, without even the courtesy of submitting his
resignation as a Magdiwang minister. [18] Jose del Rosario, a
lawyer who served for a time as a colonel on Alvarez’s own staff, became a
secret ally (“lihim na kapanalig”)
of the Magdalo secretary of war Daniel Tirona.[19] The Tejeros convention came to an abrupt
and chaotic end, famously, after Tirona shouted that “Jose del Rosario, the
lawyer” was better qualified to fill the position of Director of the Interior
than Andres Bonifacio, whom the delegates had just elected. Teodoro Gonzales, a
lawyer attached to Bonifacio’s staff, is described by Alvarez as another
defector to the Magdalo camp. Gonzales
himself, in a brief comment published as an appendix to Alvarez’s work, says
that he remained with the Supremo up the time of the Tejeros convention, but
confirms that they had then “parted ways”.[20] Santiago Rillo,
suggests Alvarez, also aligned himself with the Magdalo leadership prior to
the Tejeros convention.[21]
Another account says that Rillo played an important role in swaying the
convention against the Magdiwang attempt to defer the establishment of a
revolutionary government.[22] Severino de las
Alas, records Alvarez, was among those who argued most forcefully at
Tejeros that the formation of a revolutionary government should not be
deferred, and should be given precedence above all else.[23]
Mariano Trias and
Emiliano Riego de Dios, in sum, had left the Magdiwang council before the
Tejeros convention, and Jose del Rosario, Teodoro Gonzales, Santiago Rillo
and Severino de las Alas sided at the convention with those who wanted,
without further delay or ado, to see the Magdalo, the Magdiwang and all the
other KKK councils subsumed under a single revolutionary government. If these six
individuals are removed from the “Magdiwang list” and reassigned together
with the nine on the “Magdalo list” to a new “revolutionary government list”,
the balance suddenly tilts. The
initial count of 17-9 in favor of the Magdiwang is converted to 11-15, and
the Magdiwang become the minority. It
is possible, in fact, that the ratio became 10-16, or even 9-17, because Alvarez also hints that question marks
hung over the Magdiwang loyalties of his deputy Captain General, Artemio
Ricarte, and his own cousin, Pascual Alvarez, the minister of the
interior. About a month before the
Tejeros convention, he relates, Bonifacio received word that the Magdalo
secretary of war, Daniel Tirona, wanted to lure Ricarte and Pascual Alvarez
away from the Magdiwang army by commissioning them as generals in the Magdalo
army. When the Supremo confronted the
three men about this allegation, Pascual Alvarez and Ricarte “laughed it off
as a private joke, but glanced at secretary Tirona” (“lihim na nagtawanan at sinulyapan lamang ang kagawad Tirona”).[24] Ricarte confirms in his own memoir that the
reports Bonifacio heard were correct, and that Tirona personally had secretly
handed the commissions to Pascual Alvarez and himself.[25] Alvarez’s memoir,
as already remarked, is not internally consistent; points of detail
frequently differ from one chapter to another. When he briefly returns to the subject of
the Tejeros convention towards the end of his narrative, however, there is a
more fundamental discrepancy. It is
almost as if, looking back at what he has written, it strikes him that his
initial portrayal of the convention as Magdiwang-dominated has been refuted
by the weight of his own evidence about the defections of his erstwhile
colleagues. Having said in chapter 32
that the convention was held at Bonifacio’s instigation, he recalls in
chapter 77 that it was summoned by the Magdalo council. Having previously assigned Emiliano Riego
de Dios, Santiago Rillo, Severino de las Alas and Teodoro Gonzales to the
Magdiwang camp, his later recollection is that by the time of Tejeros they
had become “partisans of the Magdalo government” (“nagtatanggol ng pamahalaang Magdalo”). In full, Alvarez’s final reflection on
Tejeros reads as follows:- “[In March 1897]
the leaders of the Magdalo government invited the Magdiwang leaders to a
general meeting for the purpose of discussing what had to be done to defend
the liberty of the nation. Those who
made the arrangements were the partisans of the Magdalo government, like
President Baldomero Aguinaldo, secretary Emiliano Riego de Dios,
Representative Santiago Rillo, of Batangas, Secretary of War Daniel Tirona,
secretary Severino de las
Alas, Katipunan members Teodoro Gonzales, Antonio Montenegro and others. In the belief that nothing would be
discussed aside from matters concerning the defence of liberty, the people of
the Magdiwang government did not get involved in the arrangements for the
meeting aside from preparing the agreed venue, the friar estate house at Tejeros.[26] In its detail this
version of events may well be as flawed as the earlier version, but its
suggestion that the Magdalo leadership was already taking the initiative, and
gaining the ascendancy, before Tejeros, tallies much more closely with the
evidence scattered elsewhere, both in Alvarez’s own memoir and in the other
sources. The
Tejeros convention: (iv) the elections A substantial
proportion of the Tejeros delegates commonly described as “Magdiwang” should
therefore be recategorized as “formerly Magdiwang, but now either Magdalo or
independent”. Reassigning these
individuals not only tips the balance of delegates, but casts a different
light on the results of the elections at Tejeros and consequently challenges
the impression customarily given by historians that most of the winning
candidates belonged to the Magdiwang.[27] Before the
convention ended in uproar, the delegates voted to fill five leading
positions in the revolutionary government.
Ricarte’s listing of the
candidates who stood for these positions shows that neither camp schemed or
voted as a cohesive bloc. Assuming he
remembered correctly, not one of the five elections at Tejeros was a
straightforward contest between a single Magdalo candidate and a single
Magdiwang candidate. If we annotate
his listing with the known or probable affiliations of the respective
candidates, the picture is as follows:-
For President,
Emilio Aguinaldo [Magdalo] was elected over Mariano Trias [Magdalo] and
Andres Bonifacio [Magdiwang associate]. For
Vice-President, Mariano Trias [Magdalo] was elected over Andres Bonifacio
[Magdiwang associate], Severino de las Alas [independent] and Mariano Alvarez
[Magdiwang]. For Captain
General, Artemio Ricarte [Magdiwang/independent] was elected over Santiago
Alvarez [Magdiwang]. For Director of
War, Emiliano Riego de Dios [Magdalo] was elected over Ariston Villanueva
[Magdiwang], Daniel Tirona [Magdalo] and Santiago Alvarez [Magdiwang]. For Director of
the Interior, Andres Bonifacio [Magdiwang associate] was elected over Mariano
Alvarez [Magdiwang] and Pascual Alvarez [Magdiwang/independent].[28]
Magdalo thus stood
against Magdalo, and Magdiwang against Magdiwang. Candidates were nominated as individuals as
well as standard-bearers of their respective councils, and any conspiracies
afoot were too devious, too complex for a latter-day observer to detect or
comprehend. [29] Even so, partisan loyalties were still
manifestly crucial in determining the overall outcome. The detail in
Alvarez’s account, as we have seen, indicates that two of the five men
elected – Mariano Trias and Emiliano Riego de Dios - had switched their
allegiance to the Magdalo. Their
victories, added to Aguinaldo’s, made the split 3-2 in the Magdalo’s favor. In the three contests in which candidates
from both councils stood, a Magdalo candidate won. Bonifacio and Ricarte, to put it another
way, the two winning candidates from the Magdiwang camp, were victors in
contests in which they had no Magdalo opponents. The “Acta de Tejeros”: (i) signatories and non-signatories That the convention did
divide primarily along partisan lines is confirmed by what happened the day
after. Bonifacio and the remaining
core of the Magdiwang leadership, still at the Tejeros estate house, drafted
and signed the “Acta”, insisting that the elections lacked any
legitimacy. Aguinaldo, Trias and Riego
de Dios, the three Magdalo victors, proceeded to swear their oaths of office
before a large crucifix in the convento at Tanza, about a mile distant
from Tejeros. Severino de las Alas,
Santiago Rillo and other former Magdiwangs were in the cheering crowd. Artemio Ricarte, meanwhile, oscillating
between the two camps, first affixed his signature to the “Acta”, then made
his way to the ceremonies at the Tanza convento, took his oath as
Captain General, and then went back to Tejeros and made a written declaration
saying that he had taken his oath under duress. The “Acta”,
Bonifacio related in a letter to Emilio Jacinto, had been signed by “nearly
all” the Magdiwang’s ministers. [30] This might indicate that new ministers had
been appointed to take the places of the defectors Trias and Riego de Dios,
but the sources are silent on this point.
Also absent from the signatories is Pascual Alvarez, the Magdiwang
interior minister. Of the seven
individuals named by Santiago Alvarez as having been members of the Magdiwang
cabinet in January 1897, in sum, four signed the “Acta” – Mariano Alvarez,
Jacinto Lumbreras, Diego Mojica and Ariston Villanueva; and three did not –
Mariano Trias, Emiliano Riego de Dios and Pascual Alvarez. The signatories also included the most
senior figures in the Magdiwang military high command – Santiago Alvarez,
Artemio Ricarte and two Brigadier Generals. [31] With the addition
of a few more names, and a little additional detail, the most notable “Acta” signatories and their
respective positions can be listed as follows:- Mariano Alvarez
(Noveleta), president of the SB Magdiwang; gobernadorcillo of Noveleta
prior to the revolution. Santiago Alvarez
(Noveleta), Captain General of the Magdiwang army. Andres Bonifacio
( Jacinto Lumbreras
(San Francisco de Malabon), minister of state of the SB Magdiwang and acting
president in the absence of Mariano Alvarez. Epifanio Malia
(Noveleta), Captain in the Magdiwang army. Diego Mojica (San
Francisco de Malabon), minister of finance in the SB Magdiwang; formerly
president of the SB Mapagtiis [the Katipunan council in San Francisco de
Malabon, which was merged into the Magdiwang government in early 1897]. Santos Nocon (San
Francisco de Malabon), Brigadier General in the Magdiwang army. Nicolas Portilla
(San Francisco de Malabon), Brigadier General in the Magdiwang army; formerly
secretary of SB Mapagtiis. Nicolas
Ricafrente (Noveleta), president of the Magdiwang municipal council of
Noveleta. Artemio Ricarte
(Batac, Ilocos Norte; living in San Francisco de Malabon), Deputy Captain
General of the Magdiwang army; formerly treasurer of SB Mapagtiis. Luciano San
Miguel (Noveleta), Brigadier General in the Magdiwang army. Ariston Villanueva
(Noveleta), minister of war of SB Magdiwang; gobernadorcillo of
Noveleta prior to the revolution. About the other
thirty-odd signatories, only snippets of information can be gleaned - that
Andres Villanueva, for example, was the son of Ariston Villanueva, and that
the Olaez and Angkiko families were prominent in the town of More precisely,
they belonged to the elite of Noveleta and San Francisco de Malabon, two
towns little more than four miles apart.
The defection of leaders from other towns, it is clear, men like
Severino de las Alas from Indang; Jose del Rosario from Tanza; Emiliano Riego
de Dios from Maragondon and Santiago Rillo from Tuy in Batangas, had
dramatically narrowed the territorial range of the Magdiwang’s representation
and authority The “Acta de Tejeros”: (ii)
outrage and estrangement The primary purpose of the “Acta”, as already noted, was to nullify the
Tejeros elections. Copies of the
document were to be despatched to KKK branches of the same accord (“caayon”),
and members who had not attended the convention would thereby be informed why
its outcome was illegitimate. The
Magdalo majority at Tejeros, the “Acta” affirms, had been gained by fraud. Almost all the ballot papers for their
candidates had been marked by just one person, and had been issued to people
who were not entitled to vote. The
document also reiterates one of the arguments Bonifacio had advanced for
postponing the elections – that a number of delegates had been unable to
attend. So deep was their resentment, though, that the “Acta” signatories did
not wish to confine their statement to the immediate injustice of the
elections. They wanted to place on
record as well a number of grievances against the Magdalo that pre-dated
Tejeros, going back even to the outbreak of the revolution in The Magdiwang council, the “Acta” declares, is not willing to be
subordinate to a government that is illegitimate. If anyone is to be subordinated, say the
signatories with the hint of a threat, it should be the Magdalo, because they
were the ones who caused all the trouble and who ought to be put to
right. But in the immediate future the “Acta” envisages only that loyal
revolutionists will keep their distance (“paglayo”) from the Magdalo
presidency, and will be prepared to defend the Katipunan and the Magdiwang
presidency to the death. Beyond this
talk of separation, the “Acta” says nothing about what should happen
next. No call is raised for the
election to be re-run. There is no
pledge of loyalty to the Supreme Council of the Katipunan as the still-rightful
directing body of the revolution, nor any proposal that the Supreme Congress
should be convened to frame a constitution, as had been agreed at the Imus
assembly held three months previously.
Thoughts about the way forward had momentarily got lost in a spate of
recrimination. Conclusion Very probably the
Magdiwang had good cause to be resentful; very probably the elections at
Tejeros were indeed marred by malpractice.
But this does not mean, of course, that the overall outcome would have
been different had they been orderly and clean. If the proclaimed result had been a
travesty of the convention’s will, then surely the outcry after the meeting
would have been much stronger, and would have prevailed. It would be wrong
to ask why the Magdiwang partisans “lost control” at Tejeros, these notes
have sought to show, because they had not been “in control” even when the
convention was called to order. If
there had been a time when the Magdiwang, Bonifacio and their allies held the
upper hand over the Magdalo, that time had already passed. Magdiwang prestige and influence did not
suddenly collapse without warning at Tejeros; they had already been in
decline in the weeks before. A more
pertinent line of questioning might be to ask what exactly were the causes of
the internal discord within the Magdiwang camp; what precipitated
the defections that debilitated its strength and presaged its
dissolution. The available sources,
alas, allude to these causes only vaguely, and often not at all. The
“Acta” document The “Acta de
Tejeros” was first brought to light by the historian Epifanio de los There
are at least two Tagalog versions of the text that differ from the
original. Obviously not copied from
the original, these versions are in fact retranslations into Tagalog
from either the Spanish of Epifanio de los The transcription below seeks to
restore the orthography to its original form, to render for the first time the full text of the
“Acta” as it was actually written, but this has
meant making some guesses that might be wrong. An attempt has also been made at a new English
translation. Any corrections, or
suggestions as to how the translation might be improved, will be gratefully
received. |
|
|
|
› › › › › › › › › › › › › › › › › › › › › |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Tagalog text [selyo] [38] Dito sa Tejeros sacop ng bayang Mapagtiis ng
Panguluhang Magdiuang ngayong icadalauamput tatlo ng Marzo ng isang libo
ualong daan siyam na po,t, pito. Acong
Ministro de estado na sanlang Presidente na guinoong Jacinto Lumbreras Bagong
Bayan, mga capua Ministros, Generales, Mariscales, Brigadieres, Coroneles,
mga guinoong Pangulo, at iba pang mga pinuno sa mga bayan bayang sacop ng
sinabi nang Panguluhan na may canicaniyang tungcol na taglay, paua caming
lampas na sa paghanang edad o taong nalacaran, caming lahat ay nagcapisan,
gayon din ang mga maguinoong Andres Bonifasio Maypag asa, Marangal na
Supremo, at Mariano Alvarez Mainam, casalucuyang Presidente at aming
pinagcaisahan itong mga sumusunod – Una una:
Bagay sa paghahalal ng isang Presidente, mga Ministros, generales at
iba pang tungcol na marapat, na pinagcaisahan[39]
naming ng cabilang Presidencia Panguluhang Magdalo, at sa catunaya,i, ginaua cahapon
sa nasabing Tejeros, datapua hindi naming masang ayunan sapagca’t ualang
cahusayan, nahalata naming totoo ang pag api sa aming Presidencia, dahil sa
isa halos ang manunulat ng canilang papeleta ng paghahalal, cahima’t ualang
cabuluhang tao ay binigyan macarami sila, napagcilala naming na sila,i, mag
cacatiyap na sa dahilang ito’y pinauaualan naming halaga ang nangyaring yaon,
at sa catunaya,i, ualang casulatang maayos na ibinago na dapat naming
pagpirmahan, at ang isa pang malaquing caculangan, ay hindi nahaharap at uala
roon ang iba naming capatid na Pinuno. Icalaua:
Aming natuclasan ang mga lihim nilang gaua upang masacupan nila ang
aming Presidencia ay nangahas ng hindi catuiran, na ang General Emilio
Aguinaldo, ay nag-anyaya sa mga Pangulong nasasacupan namin ng isang bagay na
hindi sinaysay sa mag liham na limbag; cung ano ang dahil, at hindi
pinaalaman dito sa aming Panguluhan. Icatlo: Ang
dalauang bayan nasasacupan nila na Silang at Marinas ay naagao ng mga caauay
na Castila, at dahil dito,i, maraming totoo ang mga caual na namatay dito sa
amin, bucod pa ang mga gugol na ilac, mga hayop, bigas, maraming totoong
nasugatan at iba pang caabalahang malaqui, ngunit ang aming mga bayang
nasasacupan, ay sa aua ng Dios uala ni isang naaagao ang sinabi nang caauay. Icaapat: Ni
minsa,i, hindi cami humihingi ng anumang saclolo sa canila, cundi sila, sila
sa amin. Icalima: Ang mga tao namin, halos arao-gabi ay nasa
laban, sa pagtatangol sa canila, bucod pa ang ibang malalaquing carapatan, at
ang igaganti, ay ang macuha sa lalang ang aming Presidencia. Ica-anim:
Cami ang nagsimula ng caguluhan at sila,i, huli. Sa bagay na ito na napagtalastas naming
samahan sa capatid ang paquita nila sa amin, ay nagcaisa naman cami sa paglayo
sa canila na di maaaring masacupan itong aming Panguluhan, cahit anumang
masapit, subalit sila ang pasacop at catuiran, yayamang sa canila mula ang
lahat ng sigalot. Ibinangon namin
itong casulatan sa ilalim ng matibay na panunumpa, nananagot ang aming buhay
at yaman sa pag tatangol at icapanatag ng nabangit ng aming Presidencia,
caming lahat at ang iba pang nasasacupan at pasasacop ay napaiilalim sa
casulatang ito; ang sinuman sa aming na mapahamac ng sa lihim man at hayag o
mamatay ng sa masamang paraan, ay pag uusigin ng calahatan na di titigilan
hangang sa di matuclas ang maybadha ng pagayong bagay cung sacali, at lapatan
ng tapat na parusa pinagcaisahan din namin, na ang sinuman sa amin at maglilo
sa usapang ito, ay pag tutulungan ng calahatan na di caaauaan; gayundin naman
pagpipilitan naming patiyagaan ang mga taong may acalang tacsil[40]
ng sa di catuiran laban sa K.K.K. at sa Panguluhan o sa aming lahat na
magcacapatid, ang mga ito,i, mahigpit naming huhulihin at ipadadala sa
Presidencia ng sa madaling panahon ay maparusahan. Tinapos itong pinagcayarian na sa ngalan ng
banal na Catipunan, caming lahat ay nag titic ng aming pangalan, apellido at
ngalan sa nasabing Catipunan, na baga ma,t, cami ay marami; ay iisa ang loob,
tapang, pag mamasaquitan, cahihiyan at buhay, ang catibayang ito,i, iingatan
sa Presidencia, at mag papadala ng saling limbag sa mga bayang caayon na
ingatan naman ng mga Pangulong capatid o ibang puno. Niyari ito sa nasabing buan, arao at taon – Ang Haring bayan J.
Lumbreras And. Bonifacio Mariano
Alvarez Artemio Ricarte
Maypagasa Mainam Vibora Santiago Alvarez Santos
Nocon Diego
Moxica Apoy Buhat Katibayan Andres Villanueva Jose
Coronel Nicols
P. Ginicu [?] Gumamela Alimbuyuguin Mangyari [?] Marcelo Lumbreras Ricardo
Garcia M/Batangbago[?] Tanauin
[?] Alfonso Siacon [?] Lucio
Riel [?] [pamagat illegible] Kapayapaan [Two signatures A.
Villanueva and pamagat illegible] Kampupot L. San Miguel Damaso
[?] Maon [?] Mag patay [?] Dionicio Kases [?] Nicolas
Ricafrente Mabuti Saklolo
[?] Bernardo Espineli [?] Angkiko
[?] [pamagat illegible] [pamagat
illegible] Isabelo Borromeo [?] Adriano
Olaez Guiami [?] [no
pamagat] Epifanio Malia Mariano
Alvarez[41]
[?] [no pamagat] [no
pamagat] P. Villana [?] Jacinto
Angkiko Buan [?] Maagap [signature illegible] Gregorio
Ricafrente [pamagat illegible] [pamagat
illegible] English
translation Here at Tejeros, within the jurisdiction of the town
of Mapagtiis[42],
of the Magdiwang Presidency, this twenty-third day of March one thousand,
eight hundred and ninety-seven. I,
the Minister of State and Acting President, Mr. Jacinto Lumbreras, Bagong
Bayan[43],
fellow Ministers, Generals, Marshals, Brigadiers, Colonels, Presidents and
other leaders from the towns within the jurisdiction of the said Presidency
having offices with which they are vested, each of us of legal age and
competent, have convened together, and also with Messrs. Andres Bonifacio,
Maypagasa, esteemed Supremo; and Mariano Alvarez, Mainam, the present
President, and our agreement is as follows: First: As
regards the election of a President, Ministers, Generals and other necessary
officers, we came to an agreement with the other Presidency, the Magdalo
Presidency, and [the election] was accordingly held yesterday at the
aforementioned Tejeros, but we are not content because it was not well
conducted. We discovered that our
Presidency in truth was wronged, because almost all their ballot papers were
written by just one person, and [issued to] unqualified people so as to give
them a majority. We have learned that
they conspired together, and for this reason we consider that what happened
there was invalid. No document, in
fact, was prepared to formalise the new arrangements, which needed our signed
endorsement. Yet another major
deficiency was that some of our brother chiefs were elsewhere and unable to
attend. Second: We
have discovered their secret moves, audacious and improper, to place our
Presidency under their control. For
some reason not known here in our Presidency, General Emilio Aguinaldo
invited the presidents in our jurisdiction to consider a matter not mentioned
in the printed letter. Third: Two
towns under their jurisdiction, Silang and Marinas[44],
were captured by the Spanish enemy, and very many of our soldiers died as a
result, and in addition to our having made contributions of cash, animals and
rice, we had many wounded and suffered other great losses. But thanks to the mercy of God, not one of
the towns under our jurisdiction has been captured by the said enemy. Fourth: Not
once have we solicited any kind of aid from them, whereas they have from us. Fifth: Our people
have been fighting practically day and night in order to defend them, as well
as contributing greatly in other ways, and the reward has been an attempt to
take our Presidency away from us by fraud.
Sixth: We
began the rebellion and they came later.
In this regard, our association has realised that their actions
towards us are not those of true brothers, and we have agreed to distance
ourselves from them so that our Presidency cannot be made subordinate, whatever
happens. But they are the ones who
should submit and be put to right, because they caused all the trouble. We ratify this document under a binding
oath to commit our lives and wealth to the defence and support of our said
Presidency. All of us, other
affiliates and those who wish to become affiliates, will abide by this
document. Should any amongst us come
to suffer misfortune, openly or secretly, or be wickedly killed, we shall all
investigate and shall not rest until the perpetrator, if such there be, is
found and duly punished. We resolve
also that should any amongst us betray this compact, we shall all turn upon
him without mercy. We shall likewise
act vigorously to track down individuals who presume to commit some vile
treason against the K.K.K. and the Presidency, or against any of our
brethren. We shall pursue them
relentlessly and despatch them to the Presidency as soon as possible for
punishment. We conclude this compact
in the name of the revered Catipunan, all signing with our names, surnames
and names in the said Catipunan.
Although we are many, we are united as one in our sentiment, courage,
solidarity, unworthiness and life.
This resolution will be kept securely in the Presidency, and printed
copies will be despatched to towns of the same accord to be likewise safely kept
by brother Presidents or other leaders.
This was done on the month, day and year above written. Addendum[45] [seal] Sangunian Bayan Magdalo Kgg.
G. Felix Cuenca at G. Mariano Noriel Gargano Capag
tangap nio po yaring calatas ay mangyaring isaisip ang cung sino ang mga
maguinoong nararapat sa Kgg na pulungan ng hihimacsic (Gobierno
revolucionario) at pulungan din naman ng hihimacsic sa bauat hucuman
(Gobierno Provincial) alang alang sa isang Kalatas ng G. Presidente sa
Magdiwang na tinangap co po ng may alas 12 nitong gabi at doo,i, tayo
inaanayahan na mangyaring macarating bucas 22 na lumalacad sa Hacienda ng
Tejeros upang doo,i, magaua ang tinatauag na sabing butusan sa pag hahalal ng mga punong nasambit sa itaas. Caya po sabagay na ito ay inaasahan co na ang inñong
mga Kamahalan haharap dito sa bahay Hacienda (cung ualang malaquing panganib)
datapua,t, mag lalagay capo ng sucat macatauan sa pamamahala ng inñong tuncol
dian sa panguluhan sa alas seis ng umaga nang nasabing arao. Haligue, 21 ng Marzo Ang
Plo. B.
Aguinaldo H.K.:
Pagsabihan mo po ang mga G. Plo ng taga ibang bayan dian at ipagsauna
na huag mag culang. |
|
|
|
Notes |
|
|
